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“No Concealed Motives”: How the U.S.
Came to Dominate Micronesia
Sean Senn
Voicing his opinion to the House of Representatives on February 3, 1947,
Montana representative Mike Mansfield spoke to the United States’ colonial
interests in the Pacific: “I would prefer to have the United States assume complete
and undisputed control of the mandates...We have no concealed motives because
we want these islands for one purpose only and that is national security.”1 After
the U.S. overcoming Japanese control of the Pacific during World War II, the U.S.
wanted to keep the Pacific and its islands as a buffer and staging ground to better
prepare for any future advances from East Asia.
The U.S. imperial interests included the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the
Marshal Islands, and the Republic of Palau. Nevertheless, being a self-proclaimed
defender of democracy and popular sovereignty, the U.S. could not just annex the
Pacific territories it occupied. Thus, to ensure its national security while avoiding
1 U.S. Congress, House, “Congressional Record,” 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, 764-769.
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a tarnish to its reputation, the United States went through the newly established
United Nations to devise, approve, and implement a stopgap measure which
placed the geographic area known as Micronesia under U.S. jurisdiction as the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) until a permanent solution could be
found.
From 1947 to 1960, the U.S. was very complacent in its policy towards
the TTPI. However, developments on the international stage compelled the U.S.
to change its relaxed attitude. In the next decades, the U.S. radically increased its
“development” of Micronesia and poured funds into centralized institutions that
replaced the power and influence of local societies. Using U.S. federal government
documents, economic development reports, published interviews, and leaked
government papers to explain why and how the U.S. changed its policy, this
paper argues that the U.S. presented the Micronesian population with a Faustian
bargain whereby the Micronesian population gained the fruits of modernity but
had to become increasingly reliant on U.S. funded jobs, welfare programs, and
infrastructure. Although the U.S. claimed the development of Micronesia came
from a benevolent place, U.S. representatives also used its reliance as leverage to
ensure the Micronesian delegation conceded to maintain U.S. control of their
land through a Compact of Free Association, or CFA.
The United States’ policy following the United Nation’s 1961 Visiting
Mission report was one of massive expenditure and subsidization as it sought to
quickly transform the Micronesian economy and society into a shape it could
control implicitly. However, prior to this United Nations report, with its interests
in the region secure, the U.S. saw no need to do anything more than what previous
imperial powers had done in the past. From 1952 to 1960, the U.S. only had a 7.5
million dollar per year appropriation limit for the Trust Territory, and it never
spent more than seven.2
Prior to 1960, the United Nations’ missions into Micronesia and the
2 David Nevin, The American Touch in Micronesia, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1977), 81.
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reports of the United Nations Trusteeship Council were unobjectionable to U.S.
policy. However, during decolonization, more third-world countries entered the
General Assembly, leading non-imperialist countries to gain more influence in
this international body. The “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples” passed in 1960 and the United Nations Visiting
Mission to the TTPI in February of 1961 pressed hard for the self-determination
of peoples across the globe. The 1961 Mission report was much harsher than
previous ones and criticized the U.S. for failing to prepare Micronesia for
independence and for the “considerable dissatisfaction and discontent” among its
inhabitants. Suddenly faced with international embarrassment and the possibility
of losing Micronesia, the U.S. knew it had to act quickly to remedy the situation.3
Declassified documents from September 19, 1961, to February 20,
1963, reveal the Executive Branch was working on a plan of action to remedy the
situation. The Departments of State, Defense, and Interior approved one such
document sent to President Kennedy’s Executive Secretary, McGeorge Bundy.
This memo, written in April of 1962, called for the TTPI to move under the
United States’ tutelage in a new, lasting relationship within the United States’
political framework. The memo claimed it was in the interest of the people of
the TTPI and in the security interest of the United States for the two to become
associated indefinitely. To accomplish this, the memo explained, “the people of
the Trust Territory must become an educated people, prepared to exercise an
informed choice, which means a choice by people capable of weighing realistic
alternatives. There is an urgent need for the initiation of programs leading to the
improvement of education, as a first step toward the improvement of other public
sectors and the economic development of the Trust Territory.”4
One way the TTPI educated the Micronesian people was through
3 Nevin, 102-104.
4 Papers of John F. Kennedy, National Security Files, National Security Action Memoranda
[NSAM]: NSAM 145, New Policy for the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
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the official government magazine, first published as the Micronesian Monthly in
November 1951 and later renamed the Micronesian Reporter in 1956. However, this
magazine published a treasure trove of primary sources including transcriptions
of interviews with Micronesians, official reports from economic experts, relevant
comments from important Micronesian and American politicians, and the stated
plans of the TTPI government. The magazine claimed to maintain a simple goal
throughout its lifetime, “to reflect the life and developments—the big and little
happenings—of Micronesia and the people who live there.”5 The magazine was
accessible at an annual subscription rate of $2.50, published every other month of
1962. Notably, the magazine was always published from the same location as the
seat of the TTPI government. When the TTPI government headquarters was in
Guam, subscriptions were mailed there, when the TTPI headquarters was moved
to Saipan, the mailing location of the subscriptions shifted there as well. Due to
its proximity to the U.S. central governing apparatus in the Trust Territory and
the reality that its funding came from the TTPI budget, the Micronesian Reporter
certainly suffered from bias. Therefore, what it chose to publish should be
observed under a critical lens and what it chose to leave out should be investigated
further.
In its May edition of 1962, the Micronesian Reporter released
the economic goals of the TTPI to its audience. The first goal was to produce
enough food to sustain their population and eventually export surplus produce.
Additional goals included improving education, healthcare, the tourist industry,
road infrastructure and ensuring island residents could “live comfortably.”6 Later
that year on July 4, the U.S. established the provincial capital of the TTPI on
the island of Saipan. This provided a place from which Micronesia’s limited selfgovernment could work with the TTPI administration. It was no coincidence
that the same day the TTPI got its first official self-governing structure was also
5 “A New Name,” Micronesian Reporter, March 1956.
6 “The Job is Big,” Micronesian Reporter, May 1962.
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the United States’ independence day. Senator Henry Jackson explained why
July 4 was chosen that very day, “The establishment of the provisional capital
on the anniversary of the independence of the United States is symbolic of
the determination to achieve their fullest possible development.”7 On July 19,
President Kennedy signed bill S. 2775 which increased yearly appropriations
to Micronesia from 7.5 million to 17.5 million dollars. During a White House
press release the next day, the President voiced his support for the bill, explaining
that the bill provided the funds needed to fulfill the United States’ responsibility
as stewards and developers of the TTPI. The President stated that the highest
priority was education; He specifically mentioned that Micronesian schools
would be upgraded to a level comparable to that of American schools and finished
by proclaiming, “The people of the Trust Territory, I am sure, will mark this day as
the beginning of a new era of progress for the Trust Territory and its inhabitants.”8
At the 1963 meeting of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, the
members were overwhelmingly positive about the increased development of
Micronesia. The only exception was the Soviet Union, whose delegate questioned
whether the U.S. was sincere in its stated goal to grant the TTPI independence.
He pointed out the irony that only the United States-run Council of Micronesia
would decide when an independence referendum would occur and not the
Micronesian people themselves, which ran contrary to the United States’ public
stance on self-determination.9 Having control of the date of the plebiscite meant
the U.S. could wait until they could guarantee a favorable outcome. As part of
achieving that outcome, the U.S. continued to assess the situation in Micronesia
and draft a solid plan of action.
In its July 1963 press release, the Micronesian Reporter discussed the six
week Solomon Mission undertaken at the behest of the President to produce a
7 Henry Jackson, “Messages to the People of Micronesia,” Micronesian Reporter, July 1962.
8 John Kennedy, “President Kennedy Signs Law and Makes Statement For Progress in the Trust
Territory,” Micronesian Reporter, July 1962.
9 “The Annual Quiz at the United Nations,” Micronesian Reporter, May 1963.
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“study of its problems and potentials; from these findings will be proposals and
recommendations for a more rapid development of the Territory’s economic,
social, and political resources.”10 The general recommendation that Anthony
Solomon shared with the Reporter was that the Trust Territory government
should continue to increase its expenditures so that all the necessary aspects of
the Micronesian economy could be improved. Solomon’s list included more
educational and public health facilities, improved economic infrastructure
including roads, docks, and airstrips, additional communication nodes, and
more supply depots.11 The Micronesian Reporter did not delve any deeper into
Solomon’s mission or his resulting report to the President even though the results
of the mission were going to help determine the direction of the TTPI. This lack
of investigation may be because of the bias Reporter was prone to as noted earlier.
By contrast, the Friends of Micronesia was an anti-imperialist news source
not reliant on the TTPI. In 1971, they published the “Solomon Report” which
they claimed was a leaked government document that Solomon gave to the
U.S. President. Dated October 9, 1963, the document outlined a plan to ensure
Micronesia stayed permanently associated with the U.S. and allowed the U.S. to
fulfill its security interests in the region. In order to achieve this without suffering
excessive international backlash, the plan sought to ensure Micronesians would
choose to stay associated with the U.S. by voting for the new relationship through
a plebiscite.
The main method through which the U.S. sought to accomplish this was
through economic policy. The report explained that the U.S. should be prepared
to heavily subsidize Micronesia and recognize it as a “strategic rental.” Ninetyfive percent of the TTPI’s budget was funded by the U.S. in 1963 and the report
stressed the necessity of maintaining such a significant percentage to maintain
leverage. However, it cautioned that the U.S. must also recognize the concerns
10 “The Solomon Mission,” Micronesian Reporter, July 1963.
11 Ibid.
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of the local chiefs and new Micronesian elites about relinquishing sovereignty,
becoming economically stagnant, and losing ownership of land. The TTPI
administration thus had to relax these concerns while maintaining the “strategic
rental” as a new imperialistic policy. Solomon added that education had to be an
early priority, echoing Kennedy. Furthermore, he stated that employee salaries
should be increased to levels similar to that in the U.S.; the immigration process
for Micronesians entering the U.S. should be made easier; and Social Security
should be extended to Micronesians. Later on in the report, Solomon emphasized
the importance of Micronesians receiving a modern, secondary education as an
instrument of demoralization. This “demoralizing” effect was founded on the
assumption that young Micronesians would be very resistant to return to their
“primitive” lifestyle because they would have to give up the progress they had just
tasted in school. The goal behind this tactic was to drive Micronesians to either
migrate to the U.S. or continue their education to become qualified for positions
in the TTPI. The end result would be a substantial portion of Micronesia’s future
generations relying on the U.S. for their livelihoods.12 As part of its “strategic
rental” plan, the U.S. continued to increase the ceiling for its appropriations to
the TTPI and the TTPI continued to increase its spending.13
The massive increase in spending by the TTPI increased its GDP.
However, it only simulated economic growth. This is proved by comparing
the GDP increase with the amount of U.S. grant money subsidizing the TTPI.
According to a report by economist Elizabeth Udui, “it is estimated that the Trust
Territory’s GDP increased from 1970 to 1975 at about 12% a year. But during
this time, expenses of the government financed by the U.S. grant increased at
almost the same rate (11%).” Therefore, the increase in Micronesia’s economy was
only about 1%. The increase in GDP can thus almost be fully accounted for by the

12 “The Solomon Report is Bared,” The Young Micronesian, March 1971.
13 Nevin, 136.
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increase in money available to spend by the TTPI and its population.14
There was an indubitable link between the United States’ economic
“development” and their growing domination over the Micronesian government
and people. It is common sense that a country cannot be politically independent
if it is economically dependent. In addition, America’s economic development
and centralization came with the degradation of local societal processes which in
turn led to the destruction of the Indigenous societies as a whole. For example,
status among Micronesians used to be more associated with the one’s caste
rather than accomplishment. However, the American education and economic
system dismissed hereditary power structures altogether. As more Micronesians
became reliant on imports, public jobs, public infrastructure, and public services,
support for American systems increased, while support for traditional systems
decreased. A former Micronesian delegate to the 1956 South Pacific Conference,
Edmund Gilmar, noted, “the cherished virtue of reliance on free services from
people and friends in particular is fading out. People are beginning to expect a
reward for their services. Even some of the high chiefs no longer can rely upon
free services from low caste subjects.”15
A new, Western-educated class of Micronesians was formed and
continued to grow throughout the 1960s. The growth was of such scale that
some Micronesian government officials were worried about the lack of jobs and
housing in the district centers to accommodate all the graduates, and that they
would instead turn to crime and drunkenness.16 To solve this problem, the TTPI
focused on providing government jobs and public services to this growing class
of Micronesians. Although the jobs lowered unemployment and government
subsidies built new housing, many of these jobs were bureaucratic in nature and
thus produced nothing for the economy. The primary method the TTPI used to
14 Elizabeth Udui. “Briefing on Micronesia’s Economy,” Micronesian Reporter, Oct.1978.
15 Edmund Gilmar, “Effect on Local Customs,” Micronesian Reporter, July 1963.
16 Eliuel Pretrick, “What Our Communities Need,” Micronesian Reporter, Nov. 1961.
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try and solve the problem of unemployment, high costs of living, and economic
stagnation was to increase the wages of its workers. However, all this did was
contribute to an inflationary spiral.17 With so much manpower and talent going
into the public sector, there were not many Micronesians capable or willing to
take up entrepreneurship and form their own businesses. In addition to this
obstacle, the U.S. restricted all foreign investment. The TTPI was a strategic
trust territory and was the only one created following World War II. One of
the main differences between a strategic and non-strategic trust territory was
Article 8 of the trusteeship agreement, also known as the “most favored nation”
clause, which prevented outside investment into the Trust Territory except by the
U.S. government and U.S. private companies. Some politicians from the TTPI
complained that the clause inhibited economic growth and sustainment but
the High Commissioner of the TTPI (an American) disagreed, and naturally,
nothing changed.18
All Micronesian-produced exports declined in value over time since
the Japanese were ousted during and after World War II. The only sector that saw
an increase in productivity was the tourism industry. Although Micronesia was
rich in resources related to food, clothing, and shelter, they still became more and
more dependent on foreign imports for these items. From July 1, 1970, to June 30,
1971, the Trust Territory’s imported goods were valued at just over $26.1 million
dollars and exported goods were valued at just over $3 million dollars. This was
a twenty-five percent increase in imports and a twenty-five percent decrease in
exports from the year before. For example, soap, a product that could be easily
made in Micronesia with high-quality, local ingredients, was mostly imported.
The reasons were that most islanders were never taught how to make it and had
little inclination to learn.19 Newspapers in the mainland U.S. also recognized the
17 Manuel Sablan, “The Economic Issues Where We’re Going,” Micronesian Reporter, Jan. 1972.
18 “Trusteeship in Turmoil,” Micronesian Reporter, Apr. 1971.
19 Frances McReynolds Smith, “The Fourth G in Micronesia,” Micronesian Reporter, January
1972.
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lack of economic independence in Micronesia. The Santa Cruz Sentinel noted,
“For every dollar it earns, Micronesia spends five. The difference is made up by
U.S. aid.”20
In addition to poor American policies, the Micronesians also had
many “natural” hardships in creating a modern, self-sufficient economy. The
population was spread out over a massive area making transportation expensive,
there was little arable land, cultural inhibitions to free enterprise still lingered in
the 60s and beyond, and private investment was stifled partially because of laws
implemented by the Micronesians themselves due to their enormous resistance to
foreigners owning their land.21
Micronesia’s majority reliance on U.S. capital resulted in their
representatives having little choice but to sacrifice some of their sovereignty
in exchange for the maintenance of the modern way of life the U.S. built for
them. There was another way, but it required great sacrifice. To achieve true
independence, the Micronesian economy had to better balance its exports and
imports and ensure its government and social programs were not reliant on foreign
subsidies.22 This would raise the cost of living a modern life, many would lose
their government jobs, and all would no longer be able to take advantage of the
American welfare programs. The Micronesian politicians and their constituents
had to choose between impoverished independence or signing a treaty that would
give away part of the sovereignty they so highly valued.
In the face of the United States’ control over their territory, Micronesians
have attempted to achieve two goals since they voiced their opinions in earnest
in the 1960s. They wanted their own sovereign nation and the independence
that comes with that, but they also wanted the development necessary to become
a modern state and to sustain said state. Although some Micronesians and all
20 “U.S. Grants Micronesia Independence,” Santa Cruz Sentinel, Apr. 1978.
21 Philip Quigg, “Of Age in Micronesia,” Micronesian Reporter, Oct. 1969.
22 “Economic Independence is Possible,” The Young Micronesian, Jan. 1971.
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members of the Congress of Micronesia realized that these two goals were
mutually exclusive, many still supported development. Being employed to the
U.S., TTPI government provided a good amount of stability to the Micronesians,
especially those who were young and educated. Entitlement programs such as
sick leave and death benefits were extended to all Micronesians serving the TTPI
government in January of 1964.23 In addition, a version of Social Security was
passed by the Congress of Micronesia in October of 1967 and first implemented
in 1968. However, this program was also dependent on American dollars as
noted by future FSM Vice President Yosiwo George, “twenty-five percent of
the administrative costs of the program for this current year is funded by the
Congress of Micronesia and the remaining seventy-five percent is funded by the
Trust Territory Retirement Fund. Beginning next fiscal year, the Trust Territory
Social Security Board will fund the entire operational cost from the retirement
fund as provided by the law.”24 The entitlements continued to add to the deficit
of the TTPI while giving more comfort and stability to the Micronesian people.
Another driving factor in increased government employment was
the cultural shift the new generations underwent. The growing difference in
education and culture created a great deal of alienation between the students
and their parents as students lost respect for the “old ways” and did not want to
return to their family homes and live as their ancestors did.25 Kimlock Lamurlik,
class of 1962 salutatorian for the Trust Territory School of Dental Nursing,
gave a speech at this class’s graduation that praised modernity and the scientific
progress it provided and thanked the Trust Territory administration for their help
in providing such amazing opportunities.26 Another graduate, Elmo Matthew,
revealed her enormous excitement for her career and future.

23
24
25
26

“Sick Leave and Death Benefits Extended Micronesians,” Micronesian Reporter, Jan. 1964.
Yosiwo George, “Micronesian Social Security,” Micronesian Reporter, July 1977.
Eliuel Pretrick, “What Our Communities Need,” Micronesian Reporter, Nov. 1961.
Kimlock Lamurlik, “Salutatorian Address,” Micronesian Reporter, Nov. 1962.
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I must confess, and my classmates will no doubt agree, that our
understanding of the purposes of the school was unclouded by the
positive benefits that we as individuals would receive from it. The
program offered a career where we would learn new things, satisfying our
curiosity about certain areas of human knowledge. We would become
self-supporting members of our communities. We would help to reduce
suffering and improve the health of our neighbors. May I also confess we
were swayed by the adventure that beckoned U.S., the social aspects that
amuse all young girls.27
Due to the benefits of working for the government and the lack of opportunity
and prestige elsewhere, the TTPI always employed an enormous percentage of the
workforce. According to data from the Social Security Act, 13,642 Micronesians
were employed in July of 1972. Of this number, 7,910 were employed by the
government, or about 58% of the workforce.28
Entitlement programs were another major method by which the
TTPI offered the Micronesians stability. One of the more controversial types of
entitlement programs implemented in the TTPI were the “feeding” programs,
of which the Needy Family Assistance Program was the primary program. These
initiatives began small, by just providing food to islanders suffering from the
effects of drought, population migration, tropical storms, and other disasters.
However, it gradually expanded throughout the 1970s to include the populations
of entire districts. For example, in 1978 the entire Truk District became eligible
for United States Department of Agriculture commodities. However, some
districts shot down attempts to bring this program into their area because they
saw reliance on foreign food as contrary to their goal of self-sufficiency. Even so,
the Congress of Micronesia took no action against the feeding programs because
of how popular they were among the constituency. The total population of the
TTPI in January of 1979 was about 120,000 and 65,400 of them were being fed
under the Department of Agriculture’s Needy Family Feeding Program.29
27 Elmo Matthew, “Farewell Address,” Micronesian Reporter, November 1962.
28 Richard Kanost, “Manpower Development in Micronesia,” Micronesian Reporter, Jan. 1973.
29 Elizabeth Udui. “Feeding the Multitude in Micronesia,” Micronesian Reporter, Jan. 1979.
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As part of the United States’ plan to integrate Micronesia within its
sphere and to improve the legitimacy of their political relationship, it sought to
include Micronesians in as many steps of the process as possible. The Fifth South
Pacific Conference was held in July of 1962 and was attended by two delegates
of the Trust Territory, Thomas Remengesau and William Allen. “The general
consensus of the Conference was the extension of an increase in economic and
social advancement programs.” The conference also affirmed the plan to develop
Micronesia with a heavy emphasis on education early on.30 Another international
organization, the South Pacific Commission, saw the presence of more islanders
in its 1962 annual meeting than ever before. The U.S. was particularly proud
of Richard Taitano who served as a temporary Director of Territories of the
Department of the Interior during this meeting.31 He and others from the TTPI
were examples of the United States’ education policies’ success in progressing the
Micronesian people.
However, some prominent Micronesians publicly voiced their concerns
over the large American influence in their country. Hirosi Ismael, a Senator of the
Congress of Micronesia, outlined his worries about who controlled the financial
strings in the TTPI during an interview with the Micronesian Reporter in 1969.
He mentioned that even the Senators of the Congress of Micronesia were being
paid from the American purse. In addition, he was distressed that his people were
far from ready to compete with the rest of the world. He told the reporter, “there
won’t be a Micronesia as you see it today. You’ll get a piece of the United States
with its international racial complex and dump it into Micronesia to replace this
present Micronesia.”32 This sentiment continued into the negotiations between
the U.S. and Micronesia representatives over the end of the TTPI. The delegation
30 “Fifth South Pacific Conference,” Micronesian Reporter, July 1962.
31 Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. National Security Files. National Security
Action Memoranda [NSAM]: NSAM 145, New Policy for the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands.
32 “Interview Hirosi Ismael,” Micronesian Reporter, Oct. 1968.
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explained that preserving the Micronesian identity people was one of their
primary goals.
“Under our present quasi-colonial status, the identity, individuality,
and dignity of the people of Micronesia are being suppressed. American
power and influence are currently so dominant in Micronesia that
Micronesia and its people are being “Americanized” at an ever increasing
rate. This is having a tremendous effect upon all aspects of Micronesian
life and society, and it will be impossible to control this influence until
the people of Micronesia can establish their own government.”33
When negotiations on the post-trusteeship status of Micronesia began
in 1970, the U.S. immediately offered commonwealth status to the Congress of
Micronesia and published the terms of the deal in the Micronesia Reporter.34 In
its offer of annexation, the United States’ terms would have given Micronesians
even more access to American government programs, economic investment,
and education. However, the Micronesian Congress promptly refused this deal
and denied every other attempt by the U.S. to annex them. The Micronesian
delegates stressed the vitality of Micronesia to be fully self-governing as a means
of preserving their people’s unique identity, their people’s legal right to the land,
and that they simply did not want to become Americans.
Unrelenting, the U.S. delegation reaffirmed one of its earliest
objectives in Micronesia when it released an official statement stating, “from
the United States viewpoint, the security situation in the Pacific region, which
was recognized in 1947 in the strategic trust arrangement, remains essentially
unchanged.”35 The U.S. delegation made it clear that anything less than its terms
under the proposed CFA would be unacceptable. Franklin Haydn Williams, the
chief American negotiator, warned the Micronesians that the U.S. would never
give up the trusteeship, “on terms which would in any way threaten stability in the
area and which would in the opinion of the United States endanger international
33 “A Bridge of Lasting Partnership,” Micronesian Reporter, July 1970.
34 Ibid.
35 “A Bridge of Lasting Partnership.”
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peace and security.”36 Although the Micronesia Reporter did not publish an
instance where the American negotiators threatened to pull there subsidies to
coerce the Micronesians, the language Williams used sheds light on just how
serious the U.S. was about getting a favorable deal. Therefore, the U.S. likely used
Micronesia’s dependence on its subsidies as a vital bargaining chip to establish
a tight, permanent relationship between them, just like was planned in the
Solomon Report.
Faced with a strong possibility of massive political and social
upheaval at home if they lost the jobs and social programs funded by the U.S.
and an American delegation that would not bend on ensuring their country’s
strategic interests, the Congress of Micronesia eventually agreed to the terms
of the CFA and presented it to the Micronesian people. A popular plebiscite
held in July of 1983 resulted in the CFA being approved by the citizens of the
new Federated States of Micronesia.37 The Trusteeship gave the U.S. complete
direct authority over the civil administration of Micronesia, while the CFA
ensured the U.S. maintained a great deal of influence while it worked behind the
scenes. It established connections between U.S. institutions and their Micronesia
counterparts, guaranteed the United States’ strategic monopoly over Micronesia’s
territory, allowed the U.S. to deny strategic access to any other nation, and gave
the U.S. the power to monitor the economic development it was funding in
Micronesia.38
The Trusteeship and the following Compact of Free Association (CFA)
were both versions of colonialism under different names. However, according to
the multiple American commissioners of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
36 “A Bridge of Lasting Partnership.”
37 Henry M. Schwalbenberg, The Journal of Pacific History 19, no. 3 (1984), 172.
38 Ronald Reagan, Exec. Order 12569, “Compact of Free Association With the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau,” Federal Register,
Oct. 16, 1986.
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and many members of Congress, the goals for the strategic trust territory were
benevolent and righteous. They publicly called for economic, political, and social
development and the independence for the people put under their charge by the
United Nations through the strategic trusteeship.39 However, although a good
deal of development was achieved, independence never was, and the unique
character of Micronesia was diminished. In addition, even the good intentions
of the Americans could be questioned since they time and again pushed for their
security concerns first whenever debating the political future of Micronesia. Not
to mention, multiple declassified, leaked, and publicly available U.S. government
documents illustrated the priority for the U.S. was always its security.
Even as the U.S. claimed to be the champion of democracy and selfdetermination, the sovereignty of the Micronesian people was always on the
negotiating table. In the end, the U.S. got the strategic access it wanted from the
CFA and the FSM continues to consume U.S. subsidies and programs to this
day without any serious backlash on the former. A wise man once said to judge
someone by the results of their actions and not by the claims of their intentions.
However, although the Americans did work hard and spend hundreds of millions
of dollars to tempt the Micronesians, the Micronesian people still had the agency
to either sacrifice what the U.S. provided or accept the Faustian bargain the U.S.
presented. In the end, enough Micronesian citizens and politicians desired the
U.S.-sponsored development and welfare enough and feared the alternative to
accept it at the expense of their independence. Today, the FSM continues to have
a CFA with the U.S. and is subsidized 110 million dollars a year in exchange for
concessions to the United States’ security interests.40 The game of great power
politics continues, and Micronesia remains one of the many pawns.

39 Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands: An
Analysis of Critical Issues, 98th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 1983.
40 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with the Federated States of Micronesia.”
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